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ALGORITHMS FOR SIMPLE STOCHASTIC GAMES
Elena Valkanova
ABSTRACT
A simple stochastic game (SSG) is a game defined on a directed multigraph and played
between players MAX and MIN. Both players have control over disjoint subsets of vertices:
player MAX controls a subset VMAX and player MIN controls a subset VMIN of vertices. The
remaining vertices fall into either VAVE, a subset of vertices that support stochastic transitions,
or SINK, a subset of vertices that have zero outdegree and are associated with a payoff in the
range [0, 1]. The game starts by placing a token on a designated start vertex. The token is
moved from its current vertex position to a neighboring one according to certain rules. A fixed
strategy σ of player MAX determines where to place the token when the token is at a vertex
of VMAX. Likewise, a fixed strategy τ of player MIN determines where to place the token
when the token is at a vertex of VMIN. When the token is at a vertex of VAVE, the token is
moved to a uniformly at random chosen neighbor. The game stops when the token arrives on
a SINK vertex; at this point, player MAX gets the payoff associated with the SINK vertex.
A fundamental question related to SSGs is the SSG value problem: Given a SSG G, is
there a strategy of playerMAX that gives him an expected payoff at least 1/2 regardless of the
strategy of player MIN? This problem is among the rare natural combinatorial problems that
belong to the class NP ∩ coNP but for which there is no known polynomial-time algorithm.
In this thesis, we survey known algorithms for the SSG value problem and characterize them
into four groups of algorithms: iterative approximation, strategy improvement, mathematical
programming, and randomized algorithms. We obtain two new algorithmic results: Our first
result is an improved worst-case, upper bound on the number of iterations required by the
Hoffman-Karp strategy improvement algorithm. Our second result is a randomized Las Vegas
strategy improvement algorithm whose expected running time is O(20.78n).
vi
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation
Game theory is a branch of applied mathematics that is used in economics, biology, en-
gineering, and computer science. Game theory captures behavior in strategic situations in
which several players must make individual choices that potentially affect the interests of
other players. There are different types of games, where the initials conditions or assumptions
may vary based on the different final objectives. In many games, a central solution concept
is that of computing equilibrium (commonly known as Nash equilibrium), where each player
has adopted a strategy that is unlikely to yield a better payoff upon change. The outcomes
(i.e, payoffs) in this case are stable in the sense that none of the players would want to deviate
from the fixed strategy yielding the equilibrium. A payoff is a number, also called utility,
that reflects the desirability of an outcome to a player and incorporates the player’s attitude
towards risk. There are two types of game representations known: standard (matrix form)
and compact form. In the standard form all possible strategies and preferences of all players
are explicitly listed. This form is very useful if there are only two players and the players have
only a few strategies. In most of the games there are many players (e.g., many traffic streams,
many ISPs controlling such streams), and so explicit representation is exponential-sized in the
nature of the game. In routing games, the strategy space of each player consists of all possible
paths from source to destination in the network, which is exponentially large in the natural
size of the game.
The application of game theory in economics was first covered in a 1944 book titled “The-
ory of Games and Economic Behavior” by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern. Game
theory has been used to analyze a wide array of economic phenomena—auctions, bargain-
ing, duopolies, fair division, oligopolies, social network formation, and voting systems. The
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solution concepts are defined in norms of rationality. There are two types of games used in
economics: cooperative and non-cooperative games. In non-cooperative games, each player
uses a strategy that represents a best response to the other strategies. In cooperative games,
a group of players coordinate their actions.
Game theory provides a model for interactive computations in multi-agent systems in com-
puter science and logic. In particular, techniques of game theory are applicable to the problem
of constructing reliable computer systems. Each game is played on a finite automaton and
each state in the automaton is owned by one of the players. The player owning the state with
the token can move the token along any of the outgoing edges to a next state, and the next turn
starts. In general, plays are infinite and the number of players and their objectives may vary
with the application. Autonomous agents with varied interests characterize many computer
systems today. Game theory appears to be a natural tool for both designing and analyzing
the interactions among such agents. Consequently, there has been much recent interest in
applying game theory to systems problems (see [AKP+02, SS95]). One system problem of
recent interest is improving the routing paths used by Internet Service Providers (ISPs) by
designing mechanisms that enable ISP coordination. The solution to this problem involves
interaction between autonomous entities and application of game theoretic approaches.
Yao’s [Yao77] principle is a game-theoretic technique for proving lower bounds on the
computational complexity of randomized algorithms, and especially of online algorithms. This
principle states that to obtain a lower bound on the performance of randomized algorithms,
it suffices to determine an appropriate distribution of difficult inputs and to prove that no
deterministic algorithm can perform well against that distribution. The theoretical basis
of this principle relies on the min-max theorem for two-person zero-sum games, which is a
fundamental result in game theory.
Many problems in artificial intelligence, networking, cryptography, computational com-
plexity theory, and computer-aided verification can be reduced to a two-player game with
specific winning conditions. The two-player stochastic game model was introduced first by
Shapley [Sha53], and a simple stochastic game (SSG) is a restriction of the general stochastic
game. SSGs have applications in reactive systems and in synthesizing controllers. An SSG is
a game defined on a directed multigraph and has two players—MAX and MIN. In a com-
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puter system, choices of MIN player for his strategy correspond to the actions available to
the software driver, and the choices of MAX player for his strategy correspond to the non-
deterministic behavior of the environment. In this context, the optimization problem is to
find an optimal strategy for MIN player in the SSG that minimizes the probability of reaching
an error state. In the simple stochastic games, rather than looking for a winning strategy,
the goal is to find an optimal strategy, that is, a strategy which guarantees the best expected
payoff for a player. The decision problem for SSGs is to determine if the MAX player will
win with probability greater than 1/2, when both players use their optimal strategies.
In this thesis, we focus on the algorithmic part of game theory. The field of algorithmic
game theory combines computer science concepts of complexity and algorithm design in game
theory. The emergence of the internet has motivated the development of algorithms for finding
equilibria in games, markets, computational auctions, peer-to-peer systems, and security and
information markets. This thesis studies algorithms for SSGs.
1.2 Our Contribution
We present known algorithms for solving SSGs and for finding their optimal strategies. We
survey known algorithms and categorized them into four groups as: iterative approximation
algorithms, strategy improvement algorithms, mathematical programming algorithms, and
randomized algorithms. We introduce basic definitions and concepts required for the analysis
of these algorithms. We formalize the notion of optimal strategies of players in SSGs, and
characterize the running time of the algorithms by their iteration complexity (i.e., the number
of iterations required to perform some fixed algorithm-specific polynomial-time computation).
We obtain two new algorithmic results: Our first result is an improved worst-case, upper bound
on the number of iterations required by the Hoffman-Karp strategy improvement algorithm.
Our second result is a randomized Las Vegas strategy improvement algorithm whose expected
running time is O(20.78n).
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1.3 Organization
The thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 1, we list some applications of game theory
and present examples. In Chapter 2, we define the SSG value problem, describe some funda-
mental properties of SSGs, and briefly introduce related models such as parity games, mean
payoff games, Markov decision processes, and stochastic games. We survey known algorithms
for the SSG value problem in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, we describe our new algorithmic
results on this problem. The results of this chapter were obtained jointly with my advisor
(R. Tripathi). Finally, we mention some future directions of work in Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER 2
SIMPLE STOCHASTIC GAMES
2.1 Background
A simple stochastic game (SSG) G is a two-player game, defined on a directed multigraph
G(V,E). The vertex set V is partitioned into disjoint subsets VMAX, VMIN, VAVE, and SINK.
There are only two vertices in the subset SINK, that are labeled as 0-sink and 1-sink. All
vertices of G, except those of SINK, have exactly two outgoing edges. The SINK vertices have
only incoming edges but no outgoing edges. One vertex of G is designated as the start vertex,
labeled start-vertex. The game G is played by two players MAX and MIN. Before the start
of G, the players are required to choose a strategy for playing the game. Both players adhere
to their respective strategy throughout the game. A strategy σ for player MAX is a mapping
from VMAX to V such that for each v ∈ VMAX, (v, σ(v)) ∈ E(G). Similarly, a strategy τ for
player MIN is a mapping from VMIN to V such that for every v ∈ VMIN, (v, τ(v)) ∈ E(G).
The game G is played as follows: A token is placed on the start vertex. At each step of the
game, the token is moved from its current vertex position v to a neighboring one according
to the following rule:
• If the current vertex v belongs to VMAX, then the MAX player takes a turn. The player
moves the token from v to σ(v).
• If the current vertex v belongs to VMIN, then the MIN player takes a turn. The player
moves the token from v to τ(v).
• If the current vertex v belongs to VAVE, then none of the players takes any turn. Instead,
the token is moved from v to a neighbor chosen uniformly at random.
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AVE(8) 0-SINK
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(9)
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Figure 2.1 A simple stochastic game G with 10 vertices (source: Condon [Con92])
• Winning conditions: If the current vertex v belongs to SINK, then the game stops. If
player MIN reaches 0-sink (i.e., v is 0-sink), then he wins the game. Otherwise, player
MAX wins the game.
The objective of each player is to maximize his/her chances of winning the game. Thus,
MAX would like to choose a strategy σ that gives the maximum chance of the token reaching
1-sink, no matter what strategy MIN chooses. On the other hand, MIN would like to choose
a strategy τ that, irrespective of the strategy chosen by MAX, gives the maximum chance of
the token reaching 0-sink.
There is also a more general version of SSGs studied in the literature [Fil81, Som05]. In
this generalized version, the game is defined on a directed multigraph G that has a set SINK
of sink vertices. A payoff p(s) ∈ [0, 1] is associated with each sink vertex s of G. The payoff
p(s) of a sink vertex is a rational number of size polynomial in the number of vertices of G.
The remaining vertices of G are partitioned into VMAX, VMIN, and VAVE, as in the original
version. If a play reaches a sink s of G, then the play stops and player MAX wins a payoff
p(s) from player MIN. The rules of playing the game at positions other than the sink vertices
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are the same as before. The objective of player MAX is to maximize his expected payoff and
that of player MIN is to minimize this amount.
Condon [Con92] showed that this more general version of SSGs can be transformed into
the originally defined SSGs. Henceforth, this thesis will consider only the more general SSGs.
2.2 Notations
The notations used in this thesis are summarized in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1 Notations for Simple Stochastic Games
Notation Meaning
G graph defining a simple stochastic game
V set of vertices of graph G = (V,E)
E set of edges of graph G = (V,E)
|A| cardinality of set A
[n] set {1, 2, . . . , n}
MAX player 1
MIN player 2
SINK vertices that have zero outdegree
start-vertex the start vertex of G
VMAX set of all MAX vertices
VMIN set of all MIN vertices
VAVE set of all AVE vertices
p(x) payoff associated with a SINK vertex x
σ strategy of MAX player
τ strategy of MIN player
vσ,τ expected payoff corresponding to strategies σ and τ
vopt optimal value vector
Fσ,τ operator with respect to strategies σ and τ
FG operator with respect to the game G
2.3 Definitions and Preliminaries
Definition 2.1 [strategies] A strategy σ for player MAX is a mapping from VMAX to V such
that for each v ∈ VMAX, (v, σ(v)) ∈ E(G). Similarly, a strategy τ for player MIN is a mapping
from VMIN to V such that for every v ∈ VMIN, (v, τ(v)) ∈ E(G).
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Definition 2.2 [stopping games] A simple stochastic game G is a stopping game if for any
position x and for all strategies σ and τ of the two players, any play of G(x) using strategies
σ and τ ends at a sink node with probability one.
Definition 2.3 [expected payoffs] Let G be a simple stochastic game with players MAX and
MIN. Let σ and τ denote their respective strategies. Let qσ,τ (x, s) denote the probability that
a play of G(x), using strategies σ and τ , ends in a node s ∈ SINK. The expected payoff
vector vσ,τ of G, corresponding to σ and τ , is a vector of values vσ,τ (x) ∈ [0, 1] for each game
position x of G such that:
vσ,τ (x) =
∑
s∈SINK
qσ,τ (x, s) · p(s).
Definition 2.4 Let G(V,E) be a simple stochastic game with players MAX and MIN. Let σ
and τ denote their respective strategies. Corresponding to σ and τ , the operator Fσ,τ : [0, 1]|V |
→ [0, 1]|V | is defined as follows: For every v ∈ [0, 1]|V |, Fσ,τ (v) = w such that for every x ∈ V ,
w(x) =

v(σ(x)) if x ∈ VMAX,
v(τ(x)) if x ∈ VMIN,
1
2 · v(y) + 12 · v(z) if x ∈ VAVE and (x, y), (x, z) ∈ E,
p(x) if x ∈ SINK.
Proposition 2.5 The vector vσ,τ of expected payoffs is the unique fixed point of the operator
Fσ,τ . That is, Fσ,τ (vσ,τ ) = vσ,τ .
Definition 2.6 Let G(V,E) be a simple stochastic game with players MAX and MIN. The
operator FG : [0, 1]|V | → [0, 1]|V | is defined as follows: For every v ∈ [0, 1]|V |, FG(v) = w
such that for every x ∈ V with (x, y), (x, z) ∈ E,
w(x) =

max{v(y), v(z)} if x ∈ VMAX,
min{v(y), v(z)} if x ∈ VMIN,
1
2 · v(y) + 12 · v(z) if x ∈ VAVE,
p(x) if x ∈ SINK.
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Definition 2.7 [optimal strategies] Let G(V,E) be a simple stochastic game with players
MAX and MIN.
• The strategies σ? and τ? are optimal at a position x if for any strategy σ of MAX and
for any strategy τ of MIN, it holds that vσ,τ?(x) ≤ vσ?,τ?(x) ≤ vσ?,τ (x).
• If σ? and τ? exist, then vopt(x) =df vσ?,τ?(x) is called an optimal value of the game G(x).
The vector vopt, whose value at any position x is vopt(x), is said to be an optimal value
vector of G.
• The strategies σ? and τ? are called optimal for G if they are optimal at every position
x of G.
Shapley [Sha53] showed that there always exists a pair of optimal strategies σ? and τ? for
a stopping simple stochastic game. Moreover, any pair of optimal strategies for this game
yields the same optimal value vector. Henceforth, we refer to an optimal value vector of a
stopping simple stochastic game as the optimal value vector of the game.
Theorem 2.8 (see [Som05]) Let G be a stopping simple stochastic game. Then, there is a
unique fixed point v? of the operator FG (i.e., FG(v?) = v?). Moreover, v?(x) is the optimal
value of G(x) for all x ∈ V .
Definition 2.9 [greedy strategies] Let G = (V,E) be a simple stochastic game with players
MAX and MIN. Let v : V → R be a value vector for G. A strategy σ of MAX player is said
to be v-greedy at x ∈MAX if v(σ(x)) = max{v(y), v(z)}, where (x, y), (x, z) ∈ E. Similarly,
a strategy τ of MIN player is said to be v-greedy at x ∈ MIN if v(τ(x)) = min{v(y), v(z)},
where (x, y), (x, z) ∈ E. (In both the cases, if there is a tie, i.e., v(y) = v(z), then it is
required that for x ∈ VMAX, v(σ(x)) equals max{v(y), v(z)}, and for x ∈ VMIN, v(τ(x)) equals
min{v(y), v(z)}.) For any player P ∈ {MAX,MIN}, a strategy for P is said to be v-greedy if
it is v-greedy at every x ∈ VP .
Proposition 2.10 (see [Som05]) Let G be a stopping simple stochastic game. Let vopt be
the optimal value vector of G. Then the following statements are equivalent: (a) strategies σ
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and τ are optimal, (b) vσ,τ = vopt, (c) strategies σ and τ are vσ,τ -greedy, and (d) strategies σ
and τ are vopt-greedy.
Howard [How60] showed that in any stopping SSG G, for every strategy σ of player MAX,
there is a strategy τ(σ) of player MIN that is optimal w.r.t. σ in the sense that, for every
x ∈ VMIN with neighbors y and z, vσ,τ(σ)(x) is equal to the minimum of vσ,τ(σ)(y) and vσ,τ(σ)(z).
Henceforward, we call τ(σ) an optimal strategy of player MIN with respect to a strategy σ of
player MAX. In the same way, we can define σ(τ) as an optimal strategy of player MAX with
respect to a strategy τ of player MIN. The strategies σ(τ) and τ(σ) are the best response
strategies of players MAX and MIN, respectively. The formal definition is as follows:
Definition 2.11 [best response strategies] Let G be a simple stochastic game with players
MAX and MIN. A strategy σ of MAX is said to be optimal with respect to a strategy τ
of MIN if for all x ∈ VMAX with child y, vσ,τ (x) ≥ vσ,τ (y). Similarly, a strategy τ of MIN
is said to be optimal with respect to a strategy σ of MAX if for all x ∈ VMIN with child y,
vσ,τ (x) ≤ vσ,τ (y).
Definition 2.12 [switchable nodes] Let G = (V,E) be a simple stochastic game with players
MAX and MIN. Let v : V → R be a value vector for G. Let x ∈ VMAX ∪ VMIN has children
y and z. The node x is said to be v-switchable if x ∈ VMAX and v(x) < max{v(y), v(z)}, or
if x ∈ VMIN and v(x) > min{v(y), v(z)}.
Definition 2.13 [stable nodes] Let G = (V,E) be a simple stochastic game with players
MAX and MIN. Let v : V → R be a value vector for G. Let x ∈ VMAX ∪ VMIN ∪ VAVE
has children y and z. The node x is said to be v-stable if the following holds: If x ∈ VMAX
then v(x) = max{v(y), v(z)}, if x ∈ VMIN then v(x) = min{v(y), v(z)}, and if x ∈ VAVE then
v(x) = 12 · v(y) + 12 · v(z). The vector v is said to be stable if for all x ∈ V , x is v-stable.
Otherwise, we say that v is not stable.
SSGs were studied by Condon [Con92, Con93], motivated by complexity-theoretic analysis
of randomized space-bounded alternating Turing machines. Condon [Con92] showed that the
SSG value problem, defined below, is in NP ∩ coNP. This problem is a rare combinatorial
problem that belongs to NP ∩ coNP, but is not known to be in P.
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Definition 2.14 [The SSG Value Problem]
• The value of a SSG G is defined to be maxσ minτ vσ,τ (start-vertex).
• The SSG value problem is defined as follows:
SSG-VAL ≡ Given a SSG G, is the value of G > 12 .
The next lemma states that there is a polynomial-time procedure that transforms a SSG
G to a stopping SSG G′ such that the value of G′ is greater than 1/2 if and only if the value
of G is greater than 1/2. Thus, a SSG G belongs to the problem SSG-VAL if and only if
G′ belongs to SSG-VAL, where G′ is the output of the procedure mentioned in Lemma 2.15.
Henceforth, whenever we say that G is a SSG, we implicitly assume that G is a stopping SSG.
Lemma 2.15 [Con92] There is a polynomial-time procedure that transforms a SSG G to a
stopping SSG G′ such that G′ has the same number of MAX and MIN vertices as G and the
value of G′ is greater than 1/2 if and only if the value of G is greater than 1/2.
Lemma 2.16 states that a pair of optimal strategies 〈σ?, τ?〉 of a stopping SSG G is sufficient
to solve the SSG value problem on G. It also implies that all pairs of optimal strategies 〈σ, τ〉
yield the same value vector vσ,τ .
Lemma 2.16 [Con92] For a stopping SSG G = (V,E), let 〈σ?, τ?〉 be a pair of optimal
strategies of players MAX and MIN. Then, for all x ∈ V ,
vσ?,τ?(x) = maxσ minτ vσ,τ (x).
Lemma 2.17 implies that a pair of strategies 〈σ, τ〉 that achieve the value of a SSG G on
a start vertex x is, in fact, an optimal pair of strategies at position x of G.
Lemma 2.17 [Con92] Let G = (V,E) be a stopping SSG and let x ∈ V . Then, the following
holds for any vertex x ∈ V ,
min
τ
max
σ
vσ,τ (x) = max
σ
min
τ
vσ,τ (x).
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2.4 Related Models
Many variants of SSGs, such as parity games, mean-payoff games, and discounted payoff
games, have been extensively studied in the literature [HK66, Der70, FV97]. SSGs are a
restriction of stochastic games. Stochastic games are a generalization of Markov decision
processes. We next briefly introduce all these models.
2.4.1 Parity Games, Mean Payoff Games, and Discounted Payoff Games
Parity games (PGs), mean payoff games (MPGs) and discounted payoff games (DPGs)
are non-cooperative two-person games, played on a directed graph in which each vertex has
at least one outgoing edge. In a parity game, the directed graph has two types of vertices,
VMAX and VMIN. Each vertex v has a positive integer color p(v) ∈ N and has at least one
outgoing edge. Similarly to a SSG, the game is between two players MAX and MIN, and the
game begins when a token is placed on the start vertex. Depending on the type of the vertex
where the token currently lies, players alternately move the token along one of its outgoing
edge and construct an infinite path v0, v1, v2, . . . called a play. Player MAX wins if the
largest vertex color p(vi) among all vertices vi occurring infinitely often in a play is odd, and
player MIN wins if the color p(vi) is even, where v0, v1, . . . is the infinite path formed by
the players. Mean payoff games (MPGs) [EM79, GKK88] are similar to PGs, but instead
of colored vertices have integer-weighted edges. In MPGs, the first player tries to maximize
the average edge weight in the limit whereas the second player tries to minimize this value.
MPGs can be used to design and analyze algorithms for job scheduling, finite-window online
string matching, and selection with limited storage. In discounted payoff games, we are given
rational discount factors. It is known that PGs can be reduced to MPGs (see [GW02]) and
that MPGs and DPGs can be reduced to SSGs [ZP96]. The decision problems corresponding
to PGS, MPGs, and DPGs are also known to be in NP ∩ coNP.
2.4.2 Markov Decision Processes (MDPS)
A Markov decision process is a single agent controlled stochastic system, which is observed
at discrete time points and is described by: a set of states S, a set of actions A, a set of
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observations O, a reward function r, a state transition function p, an observation function σ,
and an initial state s0. At every state s, the controller or the agent of the process makes an
observation o(s) and then chooses an action a ∈ A depending on the observation made. The
choice of a ∈ A in a state s results in an immediate reward r(s, a),and is accompanied by a
probabilistic transition to a new state s′ ∈ S. Depending on the type of observation made in
every state s, a Markov decision process is called a fully-observable Markov decision process
(MDP), an unobservable Markov decision process (UMDP), or a partially-observable Markov
decision process (POMDP).
Definition 2.18 (See [MGLA00, FV97]) A partially-observable Markov decision process
is a tuple M = (S, s0,A,O, p, o, r), where
• S, A, and O are finite sets of states, actions, and observations, respectively,
• so ∈ S is the initial state,
• p : S × A × S → [0, 1] is the state transition function , i.e., p(s, a, s′) is the probability
of moving to state s′ ∈ S upon taking action a ∈ A in state s ∈ S,
• o : S → O is the observation function, i.e., o(s) is the observation made in state s ∈ S,
and
• r : S × A → Z is the reward function, i.e., r(s, a) is the reward gained upon taking an
action a ∈ A in state s ∈ S.
If a POMDP is defined in such a way that the states and the observations coincide, i.e.,
S = O, and o is the identity function, then the POMDP is called fully-observable and
is denoted by MDP. In another case, when the set of observations is a singleton, then
the POMDP is called unobservable and is denoted by UMDP.
Finding an optimal policy in (MDPs) is a problem of optimization theory and is solvable
in polynomial time using linear programming [d’E63, Kha79, Kar84]. Markov decision pro-
cesses (MDPs) are widely used for modeling sequential decision-making problems that arise
in engineering and social sciences.
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2.4.3 Stochastic Games (also called “Competitive Markov Decision Processes”)
Stochastic games, also called competitive Markov decision processes, are multiagent gen-
eralizations of Markov decision processes. In stochastic games, the state transition function
depends jointly on the actions of all players; the rewards are also determined by the joint
actions of the players. A formal definition of two-person stochastic games is as follows.
Definition 2.19 (See [FV97]) A two-person stochastic game is a tuple G = (S, s0, A1,
A2, p, r1, r2), where
• S, A1, and A2 are finite sets of states, actions of player 1, and actions of player 2,
respectively.
• so ∈ S is the initial state.
• p : S × A1 × A2 × S → [0, 1] is the state transition function, i.e., p(s, a1, a2, s′) is the
probability of moving to state s′ upon action a1 ∈ A1 by player 1 and action a2 ∈ A2 by
player 2 in state s ∈ S.
• r1 : S ×A1 ×A2 → Z is the reward function of player 1, i.e., r1(s, a1, a2) is the reward
gained by player 1 upon taking action a1 ∈ A1 by player 1 and action a2 ∈ A2 by player
2 in state s ∈ S,
• r2 : S ×A1 ×A2 → Z is the reward function of player 2, i.e., r2(s, a1, a2) is the reward
gained by player 2 upon taking action a1 ∈ A1 by player 1 and action a2 ∈ A2 by player
2 in state s.
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CHAPTER 3
ALGORITHMS FOR SIMPLE STOCHASTIC GAMES
Many algorithms have been proposed for solving simple stochastic games. In this chapter,
we introduce four main methods (approaches) used in the design of these algorithms. These
methods are: the iteration approximation method, the strategy improvement method, the
mathematical programming method and randomized algorithms. There is no strict differenti-
ation between these four types and some algorithms involve more than one method to obtain
an optimal pair of strategies.
We will restrict our attention to stopping SSGs as discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.3 (see
Lemma 2.15).
3.1 Iterative Approximation Algorithms
In an iterative approximation algorithm for a stopping simple stochastic game G, the
algorithm begins with an initial value vector v1 ∈ [0, 1]|V |, which is updated from one iteration
to another. At the end of all iterations, the algorithm returns the optimal value vector vopt
and the optimal strategies σ?, τ? for G.
3.1.1 An Algorithm by Somla
Somla [Som05] proposed two iterative approximation algorithms for simple stochastic
games; we describe below one of them.
The algorithm by Somla begins with v1 = FG(0|V |). At the start of the i’th iteration,
there is a current value vector vi ∈ [0, 1]|V |. This value vector is updated to a new one
v˜ ∈ [0, 1]|V | by solving a system of linear constraints. The vector v˜ is then transformed into a
vector vi+1 = FG(v˜) for the next iteration. The algorithm terminates when the current value
vector vi leads to vi-greedy strategies 〈σi, τi〉, which are optimal for G. The requirement for
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optimality of 〈σi, τi〉 is given by Proposition 2.10: Strategies 〈σi, τi〉 are optimal for G if and
only if 〈σi, τi〉 are vσi,τi-greedy, i.e., FG(vσi,τi) = vσi,τi . At termination, the algorithm outputs
the optimal strategies 〈σi, τi〉 and the optimal value vector vσi,τi .
Algorithm 1: An Algorithm by Somla [Som05]
Input : Simple stochastic game G
Output: An optimal pair of strategies 〈σ, τ〉 and the optimal value vector vopt
begin1
Start with v1 ← FG(0|V |) and i← 12
Find vi-greedy strategies 〈σi, τi〉3
Stop if 〈σi, τi〉 are optimal. Return the optimal strategies 〈σi, τi〉 and the optimal4
value vector vi, which also equals vσi,τi5
Find a valuation v that maximizes
∑
x v(x) and satisfies the linear constraints:6
(a) vi v v7
(b) strategies 〈σi, τi〉 are v-greedy8
(c) v v Fσi,τi(v)9
Take vi+1 ← FG(v) and REPEAT steps 3-910
end11
Define a partial order on V → [0, 1] by v v v′ if and only if v(x) ≤ v′(x) for all x ∈ V . Let
W ⊆ [0, 1]|V | be a region defined by
W = {v ∈ [0, 1]|V | | v v FG(v)}.
It can be shown that the optimal expected payoff vopt is the maximal point of W under
the partial order defined by v. However, W is described by local optimality equations, which
are nonlinear. The algorithm uses the crucial idea of partitioning W into subregions Wσ,τ in
which the equations are linear. The subregions Wσ,τ are defined for each given strategies σ
and τ of respective players as follows:
Wσ,τ = {v ∈W | 〈σ, τ〉 are v-greedy and v v Fσ,τ (v)}.
The algorithm iterates through one subregion to another. In each iteration, a new subregion
is visited and a maximal element v˜ of the current subregion is determined by using linear
programming. The subregions are visited in a monotonically increasing order, defined by v,
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of their maximal elements. Eventually, the subregion containing the optimal expected payoff
vopt is visited in some iteration. At this iteration, the algorithm terminates because of the
maximality of vopt.
The algorithm finds an optimal pair of strategies after at most an exponential number
of iterations, since the number of different subregions is the same as the number of different
strategies. One drawback of this algorithm is that it is possible that the same subregion from
the graph is traversed several times during the search for an optimal pair of strategies.
3.1.2 An Algorithm by Shapley
Algorithm 2: An Algorithm by Shapley [Sha53]
Input : Simple stochastic game G
Output: An optimal pair of strategies 〈σ, τ〉 and the optimal value vector vopt
begin1
Start with a value vector v initialized as follow: For every x ∈ V2
v(x) =

1 if x ∈ VMAX
0 if x ∈ VMIN
1
2 · v(y) + 12 · v(z) if x ∈ VAVE and (x, y), (x, z) ∈ E
p(x) if x ∈ SINK.3
while (FG(v) 6= v) do4
Let v′ be defined as follows:5
v′(x) =

max{v(y), v(z)} if x ∈ VMAX and (x, y), (x, z) ∈ E
min{v(y), v(z)} if x ∈ VMIN and (x, y), (x, z) ∈ E
1
2 · v(y) + 12 · v(z) if x ∈ VAVE and (x, y), (x, z) ∈ E
v(x) if x ∈ SINK.6
Set v ← v′7
Output v and v-greedy strategies 〈σ, τ〉8
end9
The algorithm uses iterative approximation method. It starts with some initial value
vector v, where all MIN vertices have value 0, all MAX vertices have value 1, and all AVE
vertices are stable. It iteratively updates v such that after each iteration, the vector v gets
closer to the optimal value vector vopt. In each iteration step, the value v(x) of each node x
is updated based on the value of its children using the operator FG until FG(v) = v, where
FG is defined in Definition 2.6. Condon [Con93] showed that in the worst case this algorithm
requires Ω(2n) iterations, where n is the number of nodes in the graph.
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3.1.3 The “Converge from Below” Algorithm by Condon
Algorithm 3: The “Converge From Below” Algorithm by Condon [Con93]
Input : Simple stochastic game G
Output: An optimal pair of strategies 〈σ, τ〉 and the optimal value vector vopt
begin1
Start with a value vector v in which all nodes x ∈ VMIN have value v(x) = 0 and2
all nodes x ∈ VMAX ∪ VAVE are stable. To find this v, use linear programming to
solve
minimize
∑
x∈V
v′(x), subject to
3
v′(x) ≥ v′(y) if x ∈ VMAX and (x, y) ∈ E
v′(x) = 0 if x ∈ VMIN
v′(x) = 12 · v′(y) + 12 · v′(z) if x ∈ VAVE and (x, y), (x, z) ∈ E
v′(x) = p(x) if x ∈ SINK4
while (FG(v) 6= v) do5
Let v′ be the solution to the following linear program, LP(v):6
maximize
∑
x∈V
v′(x), subject to
7
v′(x) ≤ v′(y) if x ∈ VMIN and (x, y) ∈ E
v′(x) = 12 · v′(y) + 12 · v′(z) if x ∈ VAVE and (x, y), (x, z) ∈ E
v′(x) = v′(y) if x ∈ VMAX & (x, y), (x, z) ∈ E, and v(y) > v(z)
v′(x) = 12 · v′(y) + 12 · v′(z) if x ∈ VMAX & (x, y), (x, z) ∈ E, and v(y) = v(z)
v′(x) = p(x) if x ∈ SINK8
Let v be the value vector in which all nodes x ∈ VMIN have value9
v(x) = v′(x) and all nodes x ∈ VMAX ∪ VAVE are stable. This v can be found
using linear programming as in Step 1
Output v and v-greedy strategies 〈σ, τ〉10
end11
The algorithm uses linear programming to output the optimal value vector vopt for game
G. It starts with an initial value vector v where all MIN vertices have value 0 and all vertices
in MAX ∪AVE are v-stable. It iteratively invokes Steps 6-9 until all vertices are stabilized.
At this point, the algorithm reaches the optimal value vector.
3.2 Strategy Improvement Algorithms
The strategy improvement method for solving a SSG was first introduced by Hoffman and
Karp [HK66]. Algorithms, based on this method, start with an initial pair of strategy(ies) for
players MAX and MIN. The algorithm iteratively computes an optimal pair of strategies. In
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each iteration, the strategy of one of the players is improved by switching the nodes at which
the optimal choice is not achieved. The main idea is that local optimization on a strategy will
eventually lead to a global optimization over the game.
3.2.1 An Algorithm by Hoffman and Karp
Algorithm 4: An Algorithm by Hoffman and Karp [HK66]
Input : Simple stochastic game G
Output: An optimal pair of strategies 〈σ, τ〉 and the optimal value vector vopt
begin1
Let σ and τ be arbitrary strategies for players MAX and MIN, respectively2
while (FG(vσ,τ ) 6= vσ,τ ) do3
Let σ′ be obtained from σ by switching all vσ,τ -switchable MAX vertices4
Let τ ′ be an optimal strategy of player MIN w.r.t. σ′5
Set σ ← σ′, τ ← τ ′6
Output 〈σ, τ〉 and the optimal value vector vσ,τ7
end8
Melekopoglou and Condon [MC90] showed that many variants of the Hoffman-Karp al-
gorithm, where, instead of switching all switchable MAX vertices, only one MAX vertex is
switched, require Ω(2n) iterations in the worst case. In Chapter 4, we show that the Hoffman-
Karp algorithm requires at most O(2n/n) iterations in the worst case. This is the best known
worst-case, upper bound on the iteration complexity of this algorithm.
3.3 Mathematical Programming Algorithms
The SSG value problem can be reduced to mathematical programming problems (e.g., to
a quadratic programming problem with non-convex objective function), which are generally
NP-hard. Some such algorithms are included in the survey by Filar and Schultz [FS86].
3.3.1 A Quadratic Programming Algorithm by Condon
In this algorithm, a (non-convex) quadratic program with linear constraints is formulated
given a SSG G. The following theorem by Condon [Con93] ensures that a locally optimal
solution to this quadratic program yields the optimal value vector of G.
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Algorithm 5: A Quadratic Programming Algorithm by Condon [Con93]
Input : Simple stochastic game G
Output: An optimal pair of strategies 〈σ, τ〉 and the optimal value vector vopt
begin1
Define the following quadratic program:2
Minimize
∑
x∈Vmax∪Vmin
with children y and z
(v(x)− v(y))(v(x)− v(z)),
subject to the constraints
v(x) ≥ v(y) if x ∈ VMAX with child y
v(x) ≤ v(y) if x ∈ VMIN with child y
v(x) = 12 · v(y) + 12 · v(z) if x ∈ VAVE with children y and z
v(x) = p(x) if x ∈ SINK
Find a locally optimal solution v to this quadratic program. Output v and3
v-greedy strategies 〈σ, τ〉.
end4
Theorem 3.1 [Con93] The objective function value is zero if and only if the value vector v
is the optimal value vector of the game. Moreover, zero is the only locally optimal solution of
the objective function in the feasible region.
Algorithm 5 finds a locally optimal solution v and outputs v-greedy strategies 〈σ, τ〉. It is
open whether a locally optimal solution to the quadratic program used in this algorithm can
be computed in polynomial time.
3.3.2 Linear Programming Algorithms
There are special cases when the SSG value problem can be solved in polynomial time.
For instance, for the case when the graph G = (V,E) defining a SSG consists of only two
types of vertices, such as (1) AVE and MAX vertices, (2) AVE and MIN vertices, or (3)
MAX and MIN, there is a polynomial-time algorithm.
Theorem 3.2 The SSG value problem restricted to SSGs with only (1) AVE and MAX
vertices, (2) AVE and MIN vertices, and (3) MAX and MIN can be solved in polynomial
time.
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Algorithm 6: An LP Algorithm for SSGs with Only AVE and MAX Vertices [Der70]
Input : A simple stochastic game G = (V,E) with only AVE and MAX vertices
Output: The optimal value vector vopt
begin1
Minimize
∑
x∈V
v(x),
2
subject to the constraints:3
v(x) ≥ v(y) if x ∈ VMAX and (x, y) ∈ E
v(x) ≥ 12 · v(y) + 12 · v(z) if x ∈ VAVE and (x, y), (x, z) ∈ E
v(x) = p(x) x ∈ SINK
v(x) ≥ 0 x ∈ V
Solve this linear program to obtain an optimal value vector v. Output v.4
end5
Algorithm 7: An LP Algorithm for SSGs with Only AVE and MIN Vertices [Con92]
Input : A simple stochastic game G = (V,E) with AVE and MIN vertices
Output: The optimal value vector vopt
begin1
Maximize
∑
x∈V
v(x),
2
subject to the constraints:3
v(x) ≤ v(y) if x ∈ VMIN and (x, y) ∈ E
v(x) ≤ 12 · v(j) + 12 · v(k) if x ∈ VAVE and (x, y), (x, z) ∈ E
v(x) = p(x) x ∈ SINK
v(x) ≥ 0 x ∈ V
Solve this linear program to obtain an optimal value vector v. Output v.4
end5
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Algorithm 8: An LP Algorithm for SSGs with Only MAX and MIN Vertices [Con92]
Input : A simple stochastic game with only MAX and MIN vertices
Output: An optimal pair of strategies 〈σ, τ〉 and the optimal value vector vopt
begin1
D ← ∅2
U ← V −D3
forall vertices x ∈ SINK do4
v(x)← p(x)5
D ← D ∪ {x}6
repeat7
forall vertices x ∈ U do8
if x ∈ VMAX with a 1-valued child in D then9
move x to D10
v(x)← 111
if x ∈ VMAX with two 0-valued children in D then12
move x to D13
v(x)← 014
if x ∈ VMIN with a 0-valued child in D then15
move x to D16
v(x)← 017
if x ∈ VMIN with two 1-valued children in D then18
move x to D19
v(x)← 120
until no vertices are moved from U to D in the loop21
forall vertices x ∈ U do22
v(x)← 023
Output v and v-greedy strategies 〈σ, τ〉.24
end25
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Proof: The proof of case (1) is due to Derman [Der70]. Consider a SSG G = (V,E),
which is an input to Algorithm 6. Since G is a stopping SSG, by Lemma 2.16 there is a unique
optimal value vector of G. We claim that if vLP is an optimal solution to the LP defined in
Algorithm 6, then vLP must be the unique optimal value vector of G.
Assume to the contrary that vLP, which is an optimal solution to the LP, is not an optimal
value vector of G. Then, at least one of the following two cases arises: (1) there is a vertex
x ∈ VMAX with neighbors y, z in G such that vLP(x) > max{vLP(y), vLP(z)}, and (2) there is
a vertex x ∈ VAVE with neighbors y, z in G such that vLP(x) > 12 · (vLP(y) + vLP(z)). In the
first case, it is easy to see that the value vector v′, defined for every u ∈ V by
v′(u) =
 vLP(u) if x 6= u, andmax{vLP(y), vLP(z)} if x = u and (x, y), (x, z) ∈ E,
is a feasible solution of the LP with an improved objective function value:
∑
x∈V v
′(x) <∑
x∈V vLP(x). This leads to a contradiction. In the second case, it is easy to see that the
value vector v′, defined for every u ∈ V by
v′(u) =
 vLP(u) if x 6= u, and1
2 · (vLP(y) + vLP(z)) if x = u and (x, y), (x, z) ∈ E,
is a feasible solution of the LP with an improved objective function value:
∑
x∈V v
′(x) <∑
x∈V vLP(x). This also leads to a contradiction. Hence, vLP must be the optimal value
vector of G.
In a similar way, we can prove case (2), i.e., that the solution output from Algorithm 7 is
the unique optimal value vector of a game G with only AVE and MIN vertices.
For the proof of case (3), consider a stopping SSG G that has onlyMAX andMIN vertices.
In this case, we claim that Algorithm 8 outputs an optimal pair of strategies 〈σ, τ〉 and the
unique optimal value vector v of G in polynomial time. The algorithm maintains two sets of
vertices D and U . D is the set of vertices whose values have already been determined and U
is the set of vertices whose values are still undetermined. The algorithm runs in polynomial
time since on each iteration except the last one at least one vertex is moved from U to D.
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The correctness of the algorithm requires some analysis whose details we omit in this thesis.
For complete details of the proof, we refer the reader to the paper [Con92].
3.4 Randomized Algorithms
3.4.1 A Randomized Variant of the Hoffman-Karp Algorithm by Condon
Algorithm 9: A Randomized Algorithm by Condon [Con93]
Input : A stopping simple stochastic game G
Output: An optimal pair of strategies 〈σ, τ〉 and the optimal value vector vopt
begin1
Let σ and τ be arbitrary strategies for players MAX and MIN, respectively2
while (FG(vσ,τ ) 6= vσ,τ ) do3
Choose 2n non-empty subsets of VMAX randomly and uniformly that are4
~vσ,τ -switchable
Let the strategies obtained by switching these subsets be σ1, . . . , σ2n5
Let the optimal strategies of player MIN with respect to σ1, . . . , σ2n be6
τ1, . . . , τ2n, respectively
Let 1 ≤ k ≤ 2n be an index such that ∑x∈V vσk,τk(x) ≥∑x∈V vσl,τl(x) for7
all 1 ≤ l ≤ 2n
Let σ ← σk and τ ← τk8
Output 〈σ, τ〉 and the optimal value vector vσ,τ9
end10
The output strategies 〈σ, τ〉 are optimal since vopt is vσ,τ -greedy. The algorithm halts
since there are only a finite number of strategies, and no pair can be repeated at the start of
a new iteration. Condon [Con93] proved the correctness of the algorithm. She also showed
that the expected number of iterations of this algorithm is 2n−f(n) + 2o(n), for any function
f(n) = o(n), where n is the number of MAX vertices.
3.4.2 A Subexponential Randomized Algorithm by Ludwig
The randomized algorithm for SSGs, proposed by Ludwig [Lud95], is subexponential in
the number of vertices of the game when the outdegree of the vertices in the game is at most
two. The algorithm will be exponential if a reduction is applied from a game with arbitrary
outdegree to a game with outdegree at most two.
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Algorithm 10: A Subexponential Randomized Algorithm by Ludwig [Lud95]
Input : A stopping SSG G = (V,E) and a strategy σ of player MAX
Output: An optimal pair of strategies 〈σ, τ〉 and the optimal value vector vopt
begin1
repeat2
Choose uniformly at random a vertex s ∈ VMAX3
Construct a new game G˜ = (V˜ , E˜) as follows:4
V˜ ← V − {s}5
E˜ ← (E − {(x, y) ∈ E | x = s or y = s}) ∪ {(x, y) | (x, s) ∈ E and σ(s) = y}6
Let the set of MAX vertices of G˜ be V˜MAX. Recursively apply the algorithm7
to the game G˜ and the strategy σ˜ : V˜MAX → V˜ of player MAX to find an
optimal strategy σ˜′ of player MAX for the game G˜. Here we define σ˜ for
every x ∈ V˜MAX as follows:
σ˜(x) = σ(x) if σ(x) 6= s, and σ˜(x) = σ(s) otherwise.8
Extend σ˜′ to a strategy σ′ for G by setting σ′(s) = σ(s).9
Find an optimal strategy τ ′ for player MIN w.r.t. the strategy σ′ in G.10
if the pair 〈σ′, τ ′〉 is optimal then11
return 〈σ′, τ ′〉 and the optimal value vector vσ′,τ ′ .12
else13
Let σ be obtained from σ′ by switching vertex s14
until an optimal pair of strategies 〈σ, τ〉 in G is found15
Output 〈σ, τ〉 and the optimal value vector vσ,τ .16
end17
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The algorithm starts with a given strategy σ of player MAX and a random choice of a
vertex s. In each iteration, a new strategy σ′ is output, which is the best strategy for player
MAX with respect to σ at vertex s. The algorithm requires solving a linear program (LP) of
size polynomial in n. It is important to note that this LP is solved for each “switch” operation
performed by the algorithm, where “switch” is defined as a change in the strategy of player
MAX at a single vertex. Therefore, the running time per switch operation is polynomial in
n. It can be shown that the expected number of switch operations performed is 2O(
√
d), where
d is the number of MAX vertices. Hence, the expected running time of this algorithm is
2O(
√
d) × poly(n), which is sub-exponential in the input size n.
Theorem 3.3 [Lud95] The expected running time of Algorithm 10 is 2O(
√
min{|VMAX|,|VMIN|})×
poly(n).
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CHAPTER 4
NEW RESULTS
In this chapter, we obtain two new algorithmic results. Our first result is an improved
worst-case, upper bound on the number of iterations required by the Hoffman-Karp strategy
improvement algorithm. This result is described in Section 4.2. Our second result is a ran-
domized Las Vegas strategy improvement algorithm whose expected running time is O(20.78n).
This result is described in Section 4.3.
All the results of this chapter were obtained jointly with my advisor (R. Tripathi). These
results appeared in preliminary form in a technical report by V. Kumar and R. Tripathi [KT04].
4.1 Preliminaries
Notation 4.1 Let G be a stopping simple stochastic game with players MAX and MIN. For
every strategy σ of player MAX, we use τ(σ) to denote the unique optimal strategy of player
MIN w.r.t. strategy σ. Likewise, for every strategy τ of player MIN, we use σ(τ) to denote
the unique optimal strategy of player MAX w.r.t. strategy τ .
Notation 4.2 Let G be a stopping simple stochastic game with players MAX and MIN.
For every strategy σ of player MAX, we use Sσ to denote the set of all vσ,τ(σ)-switchable
vertices of G. Likewise, for every strategy τ of player MIN, we use Tτ to denote the set of all
vσ(τ),τ -switchable vertices of G.
Definition 4.3 Let G be a stopping simple stochastic game with players MAX and MIN.
For every strategy σ of player MAX and subset S ⊆ Sσ, let switch(σ, S) : VMAX → V be
a strategy of player MAX obtained from σ by switching all vertices of S only. The strategy
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switch(σ, S) is defined as follows: For every x ∈ VMAX with neighbors y, z such that y = σ(x),
switch(σ, S) =
 y if x 6∈ S, andz if x ∈ S.
Likewise, for every strategy τ of player MIN and subset T ⊆ Tτ , switch(τ, T ) : VMIN → V is
defined as a strategy of player MIN obtained from τ by switching all vertices of T only. Its
formal definition is as follows: For every x ∈ VMIN with neighbors y, z such that y = τ(x),
switch(τ, T ) =
 y if x 6∈ T , andz if x ∈ T .
Definition 4.4 Let v1, v2 be value vectors in [0, 1]n, for some n ∈ N+. We say that
• v1  v2 if for each position x ∈ [n], it holds that v1(x) ≥ v2(x).
• v1  v2 if v1  v2 and there is some position x ∈ [n] such that v1(x) > v2(x).
• v1 = v2 if for each position x ∈ [n], it holds that v1(x) = v2(x).
• v1 and v2 are incomparable if there are positions x, y ∈ [n] such that v1(x) > v2(x) and
v1(y) < v2(y).
• v1 6 v2 if either v2  v1, or v1 and v2 are incomparable.
• v1 6 v2 if either v2  v1, or v1 and v2 are incomparable.
Fact 4.5 (see [Juk01, Chapter 1]) Let H(x) = −x log2 x − (1 − x) log2(1 − x), where
0 ≤ x ≤ 1 and H(0) = H(1) = 0, be the binary entropy function. Then, for every integer
0 ≤ s ≤ n/2, ∑sk=0 (nk) ≤ 2n·H(s/n).
4.2 An Improved Analysis of the Hofffman-Karp Algorithm
In this section, we obtain the first non-trivial, worst-case, upper bound on the number
of iterations required by the Hoffman-Karp algorithm, which is described as Algorithm 4 in
Section 3.2.1. Our proof technique extends the technique of Mansour and Singh [MS99] for
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bounding the number of iterations required by policy iteration algorithms to solve Markov
decison processes (MDPs). Simple stochastic games are two-person games over a finite horizon
in which the expected payoff depends on the strategies of both players. In contrast, Markov
decision processes consist of a single agent whose actions determine the cumulative award over
an infinite horizon. Because of these contrasting features, it is not obvious whether techniques
developed for analyzing Markov decision processes can be generalized in a straightforward
manner to analyze simple stochastic games. One of our contributions is to demonstrate that
simple stochastic games indeed carry some structural properties similar to Markov decision
processes, which can be harnessed to analyze these games.
The main result of this section is Theorem 4.12, which relies on several lemmas on the
properties of simple stochastic games and the Hoffman-Karp algorithm. We first present these
lemmas and their proofs, and then use these results in proving the theorem.
Lemma 4.6 Let G be a stopping simple stochastic game with n vertices and with players
MAX and MIN. Let σ and τ be strategies of players MAX and MIN, respectively. There is
an n×n matrix Q with entries in {0, 12 , 1} and an n-vector b with entries in {0}∪{p(x) | x ∈
SINK} such that vσ,τ is the unique optimal solution to the equation vσ,τ = Qvσ,τ+b. Moreover,
I−Q is invertible, all entries of (I−Q)−1 are non-negative, and the entries along the diagonal
are strictly positive.
Proof Sketch. The proof of this lemma is a straightforward extension of Lemma 1 in
Condon’s paper [Con92] to the case of simple stochastic games with payoffs. So, we refer the
reader to her paper [Con92] for this proof.
Lemma 4.7 Let G = (V,E) be a stopping simple stochastic game with players MAX and
MIN. Let σ be a strategy of player MAX such that Sσ is nonempty and let S be any nonempty
subset of Sσ. Let σ′ denote switch(σ, S), which a strategy of player MAX. Then, it holds that
vσ′,τ(σ′)  vσ,τ(σ).
Proof. As stated in Notation 4.1, let τ(σ) (τ(σ′)) denote the unique optimal strategy of
player MIN w.r.t. strategy σ (respectively, σ′) of player MAX. Throughout this proof, we
write τ for τ(σ) and τ ′ for τ(σ′) for notational convenience.
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The construction of a pair of strategies 〈σ′, τ ′〉 from 〈σ, τ〉 proceeds in two steps: con-
struction of 〈σ′, τ〉 from 〈σ, τ〉 in the first step, and construction of 〈σ′, τ ′〉 from 〈σ′, τ〉 in the
next one. In the first step, σ′ is obtained from σ as a result of switching all vertices of S.
In the second step, τ ′ is obtained from τ as a result of switching all vertices of some subset
T ⊆ VMIN. Notice that except for vertices in S ∪ T , all other vertices x ∈ VMAX − S and
u ∈ VMIN − T have σ(x) = σ′(x) and τ(u) = τ ′(u).
From Lemma 4.6, we know that vσ,τ and vσ′,τ ′ are the unique solutions to the equations
vσ,τ = Qσvσ,τ + bσ (4.1)
vσ′,τ ′ = Qσ′vσ′,τ ′ + bσ′ , (4.2)
for some Qσ, Qσ′ , bσ, and bσ′ . Let 4 = vσ′,τ ′ − vσ,τ . We show that 4 ≥ 0 and for some entry
4 is actually > 0. Clearly, by Definition 4.4 this would suffice to prove Lemma 4.7.
Subtracting Eq. (4.2) from Eq. (4.1) , we get
4 = (Qσ′vσ′,τ ′ + bσ′)− (Qσvσ,τ + bσ). (4.3)
Adding and subtracting Qσ′vσ,τ + bσ′ to 4, we get
4 = (Qσ′vσ′,τ ′ + bσ′)− (Qσ′vσ,τ + bσ′) + (Qσ′vσ,τ + bσ′)− (Qσvσ,τ + bσ), or
4 = Qσ′4+ δ, (4.4)
where δ = (Qσ′vσ,τ +bσ′)−(Qσvσ,τ +bσ). From Lemma 4.6, we know that I−Qσ′ is invertible.
Hence, there is a unique solution to 4 given by 4 = (I − Qσ′)−1δ. Lemma 4.6 also implies
that (I −Qσ′)−1 has all entries non-negative and only positive entries along the diagonal. So,
it only suffices to show that δ ≥ 0 and that some entry of δ is > 0.
The vector δ is the difference of two vectors A and B, where A = Qσ′vσ,τ + bσ′ and
B = Qσvσ,τ + bσ. Notice that the vectors A and B are equivalent to the vectors obtained by
applying Fσ′,τ ′ and Fσ,τ , respectively, on vσ,τ , where the operator Fσ′,τ ′ (or, Fσ,τ ) is defined
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in Definition 2.4. In other words, A = Fσ′,τ ′(vσ,τ ) and B = Fσ,τ (vσ,τ ). Hence, we have
δ = Fσ′,τ ′(vσ,τ )− Fσ,τ (vσ,τ ). (4.5)
Consider an arbitrary vertex x ∈ SINK of G. By definition 2.4, it follows that both A(x) and
B(x) equal p(x), the payoff associated with x. Hence, in this case δ(x) = 0 from Eq. (4.5).
Next, suppose that x ∈ S is an arbitrary vertex with (x, y), (x, z) ∈ E such that y = σ(x) and
z = σ′(x). In this case, A(x) equals vσ,τ (σ′(x)) and B(x) equals vσ,τ (σ(x)) by Definition 2.4.
Therefore, δ(x) equals vσ,τ (z) − vσ,τ (y) from Eq. (4.5). Since x ∈ S, x is a vστ -switchable
vertex of VMAX, and so by Definition 2.12, it must be the case that vσ,τ (z) > vσ,τ (y). Hence,
we get that δ(x) > 0.
Next, suppose that x ∈ T is an arbitrary vertex with (x, y), (x, z) ∈ E such that y = τ(x)
and z = τ ′(x). Then, we have A(x) = vσ,τ (τ ′(x)) = vσ,τ (z) and B(x) = vσ,τ (τ(x)) = vσ,τ (y).
Since τ is an optimal strategy w.r.t. σ and since x ∈ T ⊆ VMIN, τ(x) must point to the neighbor
of x that has the smaller value in vσ,τ . That is, it must be the case that vσ,τ (y) ≤ vσ,τ (z).
Hence, we have δ(x) ≥ 0 for every vertex x ∈ T .
Finally, consider any arbitrary vertex x ∈ V − (S ∪ T ∪ SINK). In this case, it is easy to
see that when restricted to position x, the actions of Fσ′,τ ′ and Fσ,τ on any value vector v are
the same. That is, A(x) equals B(x). It follows from Eq. (4.5) that δ(x) = 0 for every such
vertex x.
Thus, we have shown that for every x ∈ V , vσ′,τ ′(x) ≥ vσ,τ (x), and for every x ∈ S, where
S is a nonempty subset of Sσ, vσ′,τ ′(x) > vσ,τ (x). This proves that vσ′,τ ′  vσ,τ .
Lemma 4.8 Let G be a stopping simple stochastic game with players MAX and MIN. Let σ
and σ′ be strategies of player MAX such that σ′ is obtained from σ by switching a single vertex
x ∈ VMAX, i.e., σ′ = switch(σ, {x}). Then, either vσ,τ(σ)  vσ′,τ(σ′) or vσ′,τ(σ′)  vσ,τ(σ). In
other words, vσ,τ(σ) and vσ′,τ(σ′) are not incomparable.
Proof Sketch. The proof of this lemma is almost the same as that of Lemma 4.7. So, we
omit this proof.
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Lemma 4.9 Let G be a stopping simple stochastic game with players MAX and MIN. If σ
and σ′ are two distinct strategies of player MAX such that they both agree on vertices in Sσ
(i.e., ∀x ∈ Sσ, σ(x) = σ′(x)), then vσ,τ(σ)  vσ′,τ(σ′).
Proof. Consider a new game G′ = (V ′, E′) obtained from G = (V,E) as follows: V ′ equals
V and E′ is obtained from E by deleting all edges (x, z) ∈ E such that x ∈ Sσ and z 6= σ(x),
and duplicating all edges (x, y) ∈ E such that x ∈ Sσ and y = σ(x). In other words, we have
V ′ = V
E′ = E − {(x, z) | x ∈ Sσ and z 6= σ(x)}+ {(x, y) | x ∈ Sσ and y = σ(x)}.
Here, ‘+’ stands for multiset union and ‘-’ stands for multiset difference operation. Notice
that every MAX strategy in G′ is also a MAX strategy in G. Also, notice that E′ and E have
same edges, except the edges that have tail vertex from Sσ. From these observations, it follows
that G′ is a stopping simple stochastic game. Also, since σ and σ′ agree on vertices in Sσ
and E′ includes all edges (x, y) for which x ∈ Sσ and y = σ(x), both 〈σ, τ(σ)〉 and 〈σ′, τ(σ′)〉
are player strategies for G′. Let vσ,τ(σ)[G] be the value vector in G and let vσ,τ(σ)[G′] be the
value vector in G′ corresponding to the same pair of strategies 〈σ, τ〉. In a similar way, we
define vσ′,τ(σ′)[G] and vσ′,τ(σ′)[G′] corresponding to the pair of strategies 〈σ′, τ ′〉. We note
that vσ,τ(σ)[G] = vσ,τ(σ)[G′] and that vσ′,τ(σ′)[G] = vσ′,τ(σ′)[G′] based on the aforementioned
observations.
Next, notice that every vertex x 6∈ Sσ is vσ,τ(σ)[G]-stable. The equality of vσ,τ(σ)[G] and
vσ,τ(σ)[G′] implies that every x 6∈ Sσ is also vσ,τ(σ)[G′]-stable. All edges (x, y) ∈ E such
that x ∈ Sσ and y = σ(x) are duplicated in G′. Hence, every x 6∈ Sσ is also vσ,τ(σ)[G′]-
stable. Therefore, we see that every vertex of G′ is vσ,τ(σ)[G′]-stable, and so strategies σ, τ are
vσ,τ(σ)[G′]-greedy (by Definition 2.9). Since G′ is a stopping SSG, Proposition 2.10 implies
that σ and τ are optimal strategies for G′ and vσ,τ(σ)[G′] is the unique optimal value vector of
G′. Thus, we have vσ,τ(σ)[G′]  vσ′,τ(σ′)[G′] by Lemma 2.16. Using the equality of the value
vectors obtained above, we get that vσ,τ(σ)[G]  vσ′,τ(σ′)[G].
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Lemma 4.10 Let G be a stopping simple stochastic game. Let 〈σi, τ(σi)〉 and 〈σj , τ(σj)〉
be pairs of player strategies during iterations i and j, where i < j, of the Hoffman-Karp
algorithm. Then, it holds that Sσi * Sσj .
Proof. Assume to the contrary that for some i < j, Sσi ⊆ Sσj . Let S be a subset of Sσi
containing all vertices on which σi and σj disagree. (That is, S = {x ∈ Sσi | σi(x) 6= σj(x)}.)
We define a new strategy σ′ for player MAX as follows: σ′ = switch(σj , S). Then, σi and σ′
agree on vertices in Sσi . Applying Lemma 4.9, we get that vσi,τ(σi)  vσ′,τ(σ′). On the other
hand, using the facts that σ′ = switch(σj , S) and S ⊆ Sσi ⊆ Sσj , and using Lemma 4.7, it
follows that vσ′,τ(σ′)  vσj ,τ(σj). By transitivity, we get that vσi,τ(σi)  vσj ,τ(σj). However, in
the Hoffman-Karp algorithm, by Lemma 4.7, the value vectors monotonically increase with
the number of iterations, i.e., if i < j then it must be the case that vσj ,τ(σj)  vσi,τ(σi). This
leads to a contradiction.
Lemma 4.11 In the Hoffman-Karp algorithm for solving simple stochastic games, let σ,
τ(σ) be a pair of strategies at the start of an iteration, where Sσ is nonempty, and let
σ′ = switch(σ, Sσ) and τ ′ = τ(σ′) be the pair of strategies at the end of the iteration. There
there are at least |Sσ| pairs of strategies σi, τ(σi) such that vσ′,τ ′  vσi,τi  vσ,τ .
Proof. Without loosing generality, let the elements of Sσ be denoted by 1, 2, . . ., |Sσ|. For
every S ⊆ Sσ, we define σS = switch(σ, S). The unique optimal strategy of player MIN
w.r.t. σS is denoted as τ(σS) using Notation 4.1. However, for notational convenience, we
write τS for τ(σS) throughout this proof.
Assume w.l.o.g. that vσ{1},τ{1} is a minimal vector among the set of value vectors vσ{i},τ{i} ,
for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n. That is, we assume that for every 1 < i ≤ |Sσ|, either vσ{i},τ{i}  vσ{1},τ{1}
or vσ{i},τ{i} is incomparable to vσ{1},τ{1} . From Lemma 4.7, we know that vσ{1},τ{1}  vσ,τ .
We now prove that for every 1 < i ≤ |Sσ|, vσ{1,i},τ{1,i}  vσ{1},τ{1} . Once this is proven, we
can pick a minimal vector, say vσ{1,j},τ{1,j} , among the set of value vectors vσ{1,i},τ{1,i} , for
every 1 < i ≤ |Sσ|, and repeat the above proof argument iteratively to get a monotonically
decreasing sequence vσ′,τ ′ = vσSσ ,τSσ  · · ·  vσ{1,j},τ{1,j}  vσ{1},τ{1}  vσ,τ . Clearly, this
would imply the statement of the lemma.
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Assume to the contrary that for some 1 < i < |Sσ|, vσ{1,i},τ{1,i} 6 vσ{1},τ{1} . Since σ{1,i} =
switch(σ{1}, {i}), we know from Lemma 4.8 that for every 1 < i ≤ |Sσ|, either vσ{1},τ{1} 
vσ{1,i},τ{1,i} or vσ{1,i},τ{1,i}  vσ{1},τ{1} . Our assumption vσ{1,i},τ{1,i} 6 vσ{1},τ{1} implies that
we must have vσ{1},τ{1}  vσ{1,i},τ{1,i} . Next, notice that σ{1,i} also equals switch(σ{i}, {1}).
Therefore, by Lemma 4.8 either vσ{i},τ{i}  vσ{1,i},τ{1,i} or vσ{1,i},τ{1,i}  vσ{i},τ{i} . If the latter
holds, then by transitivity, we get that vσ{1},τ{1}  vσ{1,i},τ{1,i}  vσ{i},τ{i} , which will contradict
the minimality of vσ{1},τ{1} . Hence, it must be the case that vσ{i},τ{i}  vσ{1,i},τ{1,i} . Since
vσ{1},τ{1}  vσ{1,i},τ{1,i} and σ{1} = switch(σ{1,i}, {i}), we must have i ∈ Sσ{1,i} , and since
vσ{i},τ{i}  vσ{1,i},τ{1,i} and σ{i} = switch(σ{1,i}, {1}), we must have 1 ∈ Sσ{1,i} .
Thus, we have shown that {1, i} ⊆ Sσ{1,i} . By Lemma 4.7, this implies that σ, which equals
switch(σ{1,i}, {1, i}), must satisfy: vσ,τ  vσ{1,i},τ{1,i} . However, we know that {1, i} ⊆ Sσ and
σ{1,i} = switch(σ, {1, i}), and so by Lemma 4.7 we must also have vσ{1,i},τ{1,i}  vσ,τ . This
leads to a contradiction.
Theorem 4.12 The Hoffman-Karp algorithm requires at most O(2n/n) iterations in the
worst case, where n = min{|VMAX, VMIN}.
Proof. Assume that n = |VMAX| ≤ |VMIN|; if |VMAX| > |VMIN|, then we can repeat the
same proof argument with MAX and MIN interchanged. In the Hoffman-Karp algorithm,
since, by Lemma 4.7, the value vectors monotonically increase with the number of iterations,
there can be at most 2n iterations corresponding to 2n distinct subsets of switchable MAX
vertices. We partition the analysis of the number of iterations into two cases: (1) iterations
in which |Sσ| ≤ n/3 and (2) iterations in which |Sσ| > n/3. In the first case, using Fact 4.5,
the number of such iterations is bounded by
∑n/3
k=1
(
n
k
) ≤ 2n·H(1/3) since no MAX strategy
can repeat. In the second case, since |Sσ| > n/3 for each such iteration, by Lemma 4.11, the
Hoffman-Karp algorithm discards at least n/3 strategies σi, better than the current strategy
σ, in favor of the superior strategy σ′ for the next iteration. Thus, the number of iterations
in which |Sσ| > n/3 is bounded by 2nn/3 = 3 · 2
n
n . It follows that the Hoffman-Karp algorithm
requires at most 2n·H(1/3) + 3 · 2nn ≤ 4 · 2
n
n iterations in the worst case.
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4.3 A New Randomized Algorithm
We propose a Las Vegas (randomized) algorithm for solving simple stochastic games.
Our algorithm can be seen as a variation of the Hoffman-Karp algorithm in that, instead
of deterministically choosing a single switchable MAX vertex, our randomized algorithm
chooses a uniformly random subset of switchable MAX vertices in each iteration. Similar to
the results in the previous section, our results in this section are based on an extension of the
proof technique of Mansour and Singh [MS99], which they applied to analyze a randomized
policy iteration algorithm for Markov decison processes.
Our randomized algorithm is described as Algorithm 11.
Algorithm 11: Our Randomized Algorithm
Input : A stopping simple stochastic game G
Output: An optimal pair of strategies 〈σ, τ〉 and the optimal value vector vopt
begin1
Let σ, τ be arbitrary strategies of players MAX and MIN, respectively2
while (FG(vσ,τ ) 6= vσ,τ ) do3
Choose a subset S of vσ,τ -switchable MAX vertices uniformly at random4
Let σ′ be obtained from σ by switching all vertices of S5
Let τ ′ be an optimal strategy of player MIN w.r.t. σ′6
Set σ ← σ′ and τ ← τ ′7
Output 〈σ, τ〉 and the optimal value vector vσ,τ8
end9
Lemma 4.13 For each iteration i in Algorithm 11, let 〈σi, τ(σi)〉 be a pair of player strategies
at the start of this iteration. Let Si ⊆ Sσi be a subset of vσi,τ(σi)-switchable MAX vertices and
let σ′ = switch(σi, Si) be a strategy of MAX. If vσ′,τ(σ′) 6 vσi+1,τ(σi+1), then for any j ≥ i+ 2,
σ′ 6= σj.
Proof. By Lemma 4.7, for each iteration j, it holds that vσj ,τ(σj)  vσj−1,τj−1 . Assume to the
contrary that for some j ≥ i + 2, σ′ = σj . Then, by transitivity, we have vσ′,τ(σ′) = vσj ,τ(σj)
 vσj−1,τj−1  vσi+1,τ(σi+1), which contradicts the given fact that vσ′,τ(σ′) 6 vσi+1,τ(σi+1).
Lemma 4.14 In Algorithm 11, let 〈σ, τ(σ)〉 be a pair of strategies at the start of an iteration,
where Sσ is nonempty, and let 〈σ′, τ(σ′)〉 be the pair of strategies at the end of this iteration.
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Then, the expected number of strategy pairs 〈σi, τ(σi)〉 such that vσi,τ(σi) 6 vσ′,τ ′ is at least
2|Sσ |−1.
Proof. Consider an iteration in which 〈σ, τ(σ)〉 is a pair of player strategies. Let U denote
the set of all MAX strategies obtained by switching some subset of Sσ, the set of vσ,τ(σ)-
switchable MAX vertices. Clearly, |U | = 2|Sσ |. For each strategy α ∈ U , we associate two
sets: a set U+α that contains all strategies β ∈ U such that vβ,τ(β)  vα,τ(α), and a set U−α that
contains all strategies β ∈ U such that vα,τ(α)  vβ,τ(β). Note that for any pair α, β ∈ U , we
have β ∈ U+α if and only if α ∈ U−β . From this, it follows that
∑
α∈U
|U+α | =
∑
α∈U
|U−α | ≤
|U |2
2
.
Thus, for a strategy σ′ chosen uniformly at random from U , the expected number of MAX
strategies σi ∈ U such that vσi,τ(σi) 6 vσ′,τ ′ is |U | −
∑
α∈U |U+α |/|U | ≥ |U |/2 = 2|Sσ |−1.
Theorem 4.15 With probability at least 1− 2−2O(n), Algorithm 11 requires at most O(20.78n)
iterations in the worst case, where n = min{|VMAX|, |VMIN|}.
Proof. Let c ∈ (0, 1/2) that we will fix later in the proof. As in the proof of Theorem 4.12, we
bound the number of iterations in which 〈σ, τ(σ)〉 is a pair of player strategies and |Sσ| ≤ cn
by
∑cn
k=0
(
n
k
)
, which is at most 2n·H(c) by Fact 4.5.
We next bound the number of iterations in which 〈σ, τ(σ)〉 is a pair of player strategies and
|Sσ| > cn. Let 〈σ, τ(σ)〉 (〈σ′, τ(σ′)〉) be a pair of player strategies at the start (respectively,
end) of one such iteration. By Lemma 4.14, the expected number of strategy pairs 〈σi, τ(σi)〉
such that vσi,τ(σi) 6 vσ′,τ ′ is at least 2|Sσ |−1. By Lemma 4.13, none of these strategy pairs
〈σi, τ(σi)〉 is chosen in any future iteration. Therefore, the expected number of strategy pairs
〈σi, τ(σi)〉 that Algorithm 11 discards in each such iteration is at least 2|Sσ |−1 ≥ 2cn. It follows
from Markov’s inequality that with probability at least 1/2, Algorithm 11 discards at least
2cn−1 strategy pairs in each such iteration.
We say that an iteration in which |Sσ| > cn is good if Algorithm 11 discards at least 2cn−1
pairs of strategies at the end of it. We know from above that the probability that an iteration
in which |Sσ| > cn is good is at least 1/2. By Chernoff bounds, for any t > 0, at least 1/4
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of the t iterations in which |Sσ| > cn will be good with probability at least 1 − exp(−t/16).
Thus, the total number of iterations is at most 2n·H(c) + 2n·(1−c)+3 with a high probability.
For c = 0.227 and for sufficiently large n, this number of iterations is bounded by 20.78n. Also,
when the number of iterations (t) is 20.78n, then the probability of success is ≥ 1− 2−2O(n) .
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CHAPTER 5
RELATED WORK, CONCLUSION, AND OPEN PROBLEMS
Parity games are defined in Section 2.4. The algorithmic problem of solving a parity
game is: PARITY-GAME ≡ Given a game G = (VMAX, VMIN, E, p) defined on a directed
graph G = (V,E) and a start vertex v0, where (VMAX, VMIN) is a partition of V (G) and
p : V (G) → N is a color function, determine whether player MAX has a winning strategy
in the game if the token is initialy placed on vertex v0. Recall that player MAX wins if the
largest vertex color p(vi) of a vertex vi occurring infinitely often is odd, i.e., if lim supi→∞ p(vi)
is odd, while player MIN wins if it is even. Here v0, v1, v2, . . . is the infinite path formed
by the players. The best known deterministic algorithm for PARITY-GAME by Jurdzin´ski,
Paterson, and Zwick [JPZ08] runs in subexponential time. Some faster (randomized) strongly
expected subexponential-time algorithms for this problem are by Bjo¨rklund, Sandberg, and
Vorobyov [BSV03] and by Halman [Hal07]. The randomized algorithm in [BSV03] is based
on the randomized algorithm of Ludwig [Lud95] for simple stochastic games, which in turn
is inspired by the subexponential randomized simplex algorithm for linear programming by
Kalai [Kal92]. The randomized algorithm in [Hal07] is based on the known algorithm of
Matousˇek, Sharir, and Welzl [MSW96] for LP-type problems.
Mean payoff games and discounted payoff games are also defined in Section 2.4. The
algorithmic problems for these games are defined similar to the problem PARITY-GAME.
The best known (randomized) strongly expected subexponential-time algorithm for solving
mean payoff games is by Halman [Hal07], which improves upon the randomized algorithm
by Bjo¨rklund, Sandberg, and Vorobyov [BSV07]. The best known algorithm for solving dis-
counted payoff games is the (randomized) strongly expected subexponential-time algorithm
by Halman [Hal07].
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The best known algorithms for solving simple stochastic games are by Ludwig [Lud95]
and by Halman [Hal07]. Ga¨rtner and Ru¨st [GR05] showed that finding optimal strategies for
players in a simple stochastic game polynomial-time reduces to the generalized linear com-
plementarity problem (GLCP) with a P-matrix. The hardness of solving a simple stochastic
game is addressed in [Jub05].
The algorithms surveyed in this thesis are summarized in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1 Summary of Algorithms for Simple Stochastic Games
Method Algorithm Running Time
Iterative Approximation
by Somla 2O(n)
by Shapley 2O(n)
“Converge from Below” by Condon 2O(n)
Strategy Improvement The Hoffman-Karp 2O(n)
Mathematical Programming
A Quadratic Program 2O(n)
Linear Programs for Restricted SSGs nO(1)
Randomized
A Randomized Variant of the Hoffman-Karp 2O(n)
by Ludwig 2O(
√
n)
Our Algorithm 2O(n)
In this thesis, we obtained an improved worst-case, upper bound on the number of it-
erations required by the Hoffman-Karp strategy improvement algorithm. We also presented
a randomized Las Vegas strategy improvement algorithm whose expected running time is
O(20.78n).
One interesting direction for future work would be to find a super-polynomial lower bound
on the number of iterations required by the Hoffman-Karp algorithm in the worst case. An-
other interesting direction would be to conduct experimental work related to comparing algo-
rithms for their running time performance. The possibility of a polynomial-time algorithm,
or even an improved deterministic subexponential-time algorithm, cannnot be ruled out for
the simple stochastic game value problem. Obtaining an algorithm of this sort would be a
challenging research direction.
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